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In January 2019, YouTube announced its platform would exclude potentially harmful content from video
recommendations while allowing such videos to remain on the platform. While this step is intended to reduce
YouTube’s role in propagating such content, the continued availability of links to these videos in other online
spaces makes it unclear whether this compromise actually reduces their spread. To assess this impact, we
apply interrupted time series models to measure whether different types of YouTube sharing in Twitter and
Reddit changed significantly in the eight months around YouTube’s announcement. We evaluate video sharing
across three curated sets of potentially harmful, anti-social content: a set of conspiracy videos that have
been shown to experience reduced recommendations in YouTube, a larger set of videos posted by conspiracy-
oriented channels, and a set of videos posted by alternative influence network (AIN) channels. As a control,
we also evaluate effects on video sharing in a dataset of videos from mainstream news channels. Results
show conspiracy-labeled and AIN videos that have evidence of YouTube’s de-recommendation experience
a significant decreasing trend in sharing on both Twitter and Reddit. For videos from conspiracy-oriented
channels, however, we see no significant effect in Twitter but find a significant increase in the level of
conspiracy-channel sharing in Reddit. For mainstream news sharing, we actually see an increase in trend on
both platforms, suggesting YouTube’s suppression particular content types has a targeted effect. This work
therefore finds evidence that reducing exposure to anti-social videos within YouTube, without deleting these
videos, has potential pro-social, cross-platform effects in sharing across the information ecosystem. At the
same time, increases in the level of conspiracy-channel sharing raise concerns about how content producers
are responding to YouTube’s changes, and transparency from the platform is needed to evaluate these effects
further.
CCS Concepts: • Human-centered computing → Empirical studies in HCI; Social media; •
Networks→ Social media networks; • Social and professional topics→Computing / technology
policy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As of 25 January 2019, YouTube has announced an initiative to improve the quality of content on
its platform and the content the platform recommends to its users [29]. In this new effort, YouTube
claims to use a combination of machine learning and human evaluation to identify videos “that
could misinform users in harmful ways” and videos that present “borderline content”. Following
classification, YouTube removes these videos from recommendation (e.g., they are excluded from
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the "Recommended" section on users’ homepages and the "Up Next" scroll after videos) [29]. These
modifications to YouTube’s recommendation engine and their effects in the broader information
ecosystem have significant implications both for YouTube and for social media platforms in general.
First, YouTube has received considerable criticism for the role its recommendations play in
radicalizing individuals, both in popular press (e.g., Tufekci’s opinion piece in the New York Times
1) and in the academy. Academic debates around YouTube’s role in the information ecosystem
remain unsettled, with recent work by Ribeiro et al. [23] showing YouTube’s recommendation
systems may radicalize individuals, while other work (e.g., Ledwich and Zaitsev [14]) find the
opposite, and still others, like Munger and Phillips [19], argue anti-social content is popular on
YouTube, not only because of recommendation engines, but also because of the political economies
of YouTube’s audience and content producers. Evaluating the pro-social impacts of YouTube’s
recommendation engine is therefore embedded in a larger discussion of online information quality.
Second, this method of “de-recommendation” for computationally supported content moderation
is growing increasingly common in social media platforms’ toolkits for platform governance. For
instance, Facebook actively suppresses sharing of content third-party fact-checkers identify as
false,2, Reddit “quarantines” communities that continually violate its content policies3, and Twitter
has deployed similar automatedmethods for “limiting tweet visibility”4. These platforms do not exist
in isolation, however, and while other works have shown YouTube has reduced recommendations
to conspiratorial and alternative news content within its platform [9, 26], exposure to such content
can occur in many places beyond YouTube. Instead, links to YouTube content are routinely some of
the most shared across Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit, with a recent study of COVID-19 discourse
across five different online social platforms finding YouTube videos shared therein are significantly
amplified [7]. Hence, YouTube’s new approach to moderating content on their platform, and such
suppressive techniques in general, must be evaluated in the context of the broader information
ecosystem.
This paper engages with both of these sets of implications by answering the following question:
Does YouTube’s action have a significant impact on sharing patterns of harmful and misinforming
YouTube videos on other online social networking platforms? We divide this question across two
axes: the online social platform and the type of video. At the platform level, we examine whether
YouTube’s change has impacted sharing on Twitter and on Reddit. At the video level, because
YouTube does not publish or identify videos it has flagged as potentially misinforming or harmful,
we cannot directly examine impact on these “potentially harmful” videos. Instead, we rely on
related work that has been collecting in-situ recommendations for several years [9, 26]. From
these sources, we build three datasets to evaluate whether YouTube’s change affects sharing of
potentially harmful videos and compare them to a control set. Our three sets of potentially harmful
or misinforming content include videos labeled as conspiracy, videos from channels that specialize
in conspiracy content, and videos from politically extreme channels that have been identified as
part of the “Alternative Influence Network” (AIN) [16].
To evaluate the impact of YouTube’s action on these platforms and video types, we compare
sharing frequencies before and after YouTube’s announcement using a form of interrupted time
series (ITS) analysis. ITS analysis has been similarly been used to assess the impact of other content
1https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html
2Facebook reports when third-party fact-checkers “rate something as false, we rank those stories significantly lower in
News Feed. On average, this cuts future views by more than 80%.” [8]
3https://www.reddithelp.com/en/categories/rules-reporting/account-and-community-
restrictions/quarantined-subreddits
4https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-options
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moderation policies, as in Reddit’s banning of several anti-social communities in 2015, as described
in Chandrasekharan et al. [6].
Our results suggest YouTube’s de-recommendation strategy has a significant suppressive effect
on sharing of both conspiracy-focused videos and AIN-sourced videos in both Twitter and Reddit,
with our models showing a significant, consistent, and downward trend in spread. Effects on
mainstream media sharing are consistent with our expectation in that we say no suppressive effect
on either platform; rather, we actually find a significant increase in mainstream media sharing,
in trend on both platforms and in level on Reddit. For videos produced by conspiracy-oriented
channels, however, we find Reddit experiences a significant increase in the level of sharing, contrary
to expectation, and null effects on Twitter.
We conclude by reflecting on the potential normative effects YouTube’s change has on conspiracy-
and AIN-video sharing while balancing these results with the increase in content from conspiracy-
oriented channels. In this reflection, we discuss the tradeoff between deleting content compared
to limiting its propagation, with the recent popularity of the Plandemic anti-vaccine video as a
motivating example. We also discuss potential explanations for the growth of conspiracy-oriented
channels, as this finding points to potentially unanticipated amplification effects of content adjacent
to conspiracy-labeled videos. We also acknowledge that, while we examine only a strict subset of
all possible “potentially harmful and misinforming” videos, numerous other types of potentially
harmful videos exist (e.g., hate, racism, sexism, “fake news”, etc.), and how these videos are impacted
by YouTube’s moderation efforts are open and important questions.
2 BACKGROUND
YouTube’s effort is part of a larger set of endeavors by Google, Facebook, and other companies to
address radical and extremist content on their platforms. Such attempts have been controversial as
opponents to these efforts claim the platforms are censoring their users and violating free speech.
A point stressed in YouTube’s announcement, potentially in response to these claims, is that their
change “will only affect recommendations of what videos to watch, not whether a video is available
on YouTube” [29]. This move can then be viewed as a compromise, still allowing potentially
fringe ideas a platform but without actively spreading these ideas through recommendations.
Less diplomatic efforts, however, have had normative effects: Reddit went through a similar cycle
of controversy with their outright banning of several hateful communities in 2015, and while
contentious, research has since shown this ban had a socially normative effect on discourse within
Reddit [6].
YouTube’s compromise in allowing these potentially misinforming/harmful videos to remain
available has important implications since YouTube is not an isolated platform; rather, it exists within
a broader information ecosystem. This ecosystem is comprised of numerous online information
sources, from video platforms (e.g., YouTube and Twitch) to social media platforms (e.g., Facebook,
Instagram, Twitter, and Reddit) to point-to-point messaging apps (e.g., WhatsApp or WeChat) to
online news websites (e.g., the New York Times or Wall Street Journal’s websites or Internet-native
news like BuzzFeed) and blogs (e.g., Tumblr, WordPress, etc.). As the median American uses three
separate social media platforms [24], limiting exposure on a single platform (even one as large
as YouTube) may have little effect on this content’s uptake, especially if the primary avenue for
individuals to find this content is via other platforms. If a conspiracy-focused community on Reddit,
Twitter, or Facebook is creating and sharing conspiracy-focused YouTube videos in these other
spaces, such videos may still propagate rapidly across the information ecosystem regardless of
whether they are being recommended natively within YouTube.
The power of these fringe communities in sharing anti-social content is already well-supported
in the literature [17, 31], showing “tight-knit communities” in Reddit and other platforms spread
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content across the information ecosystem. Since YouTube is consistently one of the most popular
platforms globally and one of the most popular domains linked to in Twitter and Reddit, the spread
of these videos therefore may not rely on YouTube at all. Individuals’ primary vector for exposure to
this content may instead be through interactions with other conspiracy-minded people rather than
YouTube’s on-site recommendation system. Alternatively, YouTube’s recommendation algorithm
may be the primary vector through which otherwise unexposed individuals are shown this content
(though academic consensus on this issue has not been reached, e.g., [14, 19, 23, 27]), and protecting
individuals natively within YouTube could be an effective means to reduce exposure.
YouTube’s efforts also appear to be more than lip-service as well, with other researchers finding
evidence of significant in-platform reductions of recommendations to certain classes of anti-social
videos. Work by Faddoul et al. [9] in particular demonstrates YouTube’s recommendation system has
reduced recommendations to conspiratorial content within the platform. That work has developed
a set of 6,752 conspiracy-focused videos by collecting the daily top 1,000 most recommended videos
from a seed set of 1,080 information- and news-oriented channels between October 2018 and
February 2020. From these daily collections, each of the resulting 8 million recommended videos
is then passed through a binary classifier for detecting conspiratorial content, which Faddoul et
al. have trained on the video’s transcript, “snippet” content (i.e., title, description, and tags), and
comments and validated against a set of videos collected from conspiracy-oriented communities in
Rerddit. Their classifier achieves a precision of 0.78 and recall of 0.86 [9], suggesting the majority of
the conspiracy-labeled videos are correctly identified as conspiracy-oriented, and the large majority
of conspiracy-oriented videos are captured in this set. Using these conspiracy videos, Faddoul et al.
perform a longitudinal analysis of YouTube’s recommendations and show a marked decrease in
recommendation of these conspiracy videos in April 2019, with a minimum in May 2019. These
results provide strong evidence that this set of videos has been subject to de-recommendation
within YouTube’s platform.
A technical report from Digital Social Contract, a program housed at Queensland University of
Technology’s Digital Media Research Centre, describes a similar longitudinal study of YouTube
recommendations but performed on videos sourced from AIN channels rather than conspiracy-
specific channels [26]. That report shows, of in-platform recommendations from a sample of 3.6
million YouTube videos, videos posted by AIN channels were recommended 7.8% of the time in the
first two weeks of February. In the two weeks after February 15, however, these recommendations
have dropped substantially to 0.4% of recommendations, suggesting AIN-authored videos have
seen a steep decline following YouTube’s announcement.
While these works provide substantial evidence that YouTube’s change to its recommendation
systems does appear to impact within-platform recommendations, we are still left with a critical
question: Does YouTube’s choice to modify its internal recommendations without actually deleting this
content significantly impact the propagation of this content across the information ecosystem? If so,
the financial incentive to produce this content may be reduced through smaller audiences, but if not,
YouTube may need to take bolder steps to mitigate its role in the propagation of harmful content
online. This question also has broader implications in how we should craft solutions for improving
the information space: Are the actions of a single entity sufficient in this highly interconnected
environment, or must the platforms work together to address these concerns? YouTube’s decision
to stop recommending this content gives use a unique opportunity to explore this interconnection,
and this paper presents a unique analysis of these interactions across millions of social media posts
and videos.
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2.1 Prior Work in Online Moderation
Moderation in online social platforms is a well-studied problem, with most research existing on a
spectrum between user perceptions of the moderation process (e.g., Myers West [20]) to analyses
of the moderation strategy’s efficacy (e.g., Chandrasekharan et al. [6] and Chancellor et al. [5]),
with hybrid approaches in between (e.g., Newell et al. [22]). This paper fits in the latter part of this
spectrum, specifically exploring how YouTube’s announcement and ensuing action have impacted
the spread of potentially harmful content beyond YouTube’s boundaries. The majority of similar
work that studies the impact of moderation does so by identifying when a new moderation policy
went into effect on a given platform and evaluating changes in user behavior or sharing within that
same platform. While that approach has led to important findings, such as banning communities in
Reddit increasing overall platform quality [6], or that users often find ways around content-based
moderation strategies [5], it is difficult to apply to content creation platforms that do not directly
support in-platform sharing, like YouTube. YouTube sharing, on the other hand, is intrinsically
cross-platform, with the YouTube sharing button providing options for sharing to other platforms,
like Twitter, Reddit, Facebook, etc. As a result, applying similar strategies to evaluate YouTube
moderation are difficult since evaluation must necessarily use observations from other platforms.
Therefore, an important novelty of this paper is its use of cross-platform data to evaluate the impact
of YouTube’s moderation.
Of the prior work, Chandrasekharan et al. is most similar to our research [6]. In that effort,
the researchers have used a similar ITS construct to evaluate changes to both discussion and
user populations of communities within Reddit after Reddit banned several hateful and harass-
ing communities. While our work is differentiated by platform and our cross-platform context,
Chandrasekharan et al. is particularly germane as one could imagine Reddit as a microcosm of
the internet, with interconnected but separate online spaces analogized by Reddit’s subreddit
structure. In this analogy, a change to one subreddit’s moderation then indirectly impacts other
subreddits through changes in population, cross-posting behavior, and language. In fact, Reddit
has taken similar steps to YouTube’s de-recommendation by quarantining specific communities
Reddit moderators have deemed to be in violation of their terms of service, as they did with the
popular but controversial far-right subreddit /r/the_donald, a step that prevents content in that
community from appearing on Reddit’s front page [28]. Likewise, Facebook and WhatsApp have
taken similar steps to suppress the spread of problematic content by preventing WhatsApp users
from broadcasting a link more than five times [10]. Both Reddit and Facebook’s steps are similar
to YouTube’s efforts in that individuals are not banned from communicating their views, but the
platforms take steps to limit exposure of those views. As such, applying a study similar to Chan-
drasekharan et al. to investigate YouTube’s moderation approach, as we do here, has important
implications beyond YouTube.
3 DATASETS
To compare YouTube sharing before and after YouTube’s announcement to de-recommend misin-
forming and otherwise harmful videos, we use social media content collected from Twitter and
Reddit. From this data, we extract links to YouTube videos to estimate daily sharing rates before
and after this announcement. For Twitter, we leverage an archive of tweets collected from Twitter’s
public sample stream, starting on 1 October 2018 and going until 31 May 2019 (representing four
months on either side of YouTube’s change). This dataset contains 827,334,770 tweets. Studies on
this data source have identified shortcomings in its use for tracking topical coverage over time [18],
but it should be sufficient for gauging changes in popularity of individual links, as suggested in the
J. ACM, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: 2020.
0:6 Buntain et al.
stream mining chapter of Leskovec et al. [15]. We similarly collect Reddit submissions using the
PushShift.io collection [1] during the same timeframe, resulting in 78,972,984 submissions.
We cannot directly search for links to YouTube within these datasets as link shorteners (e.g.,
bit.ly or TinyURL) obfuscate the terminal destination of a shortened link. Such shorteners are often
used in social media data, accounting for 5% of links in our Twitter data and 0.03% of links in our
Reddit data. After applying the urlexpander package5 to unshorten these links, we extract links to
YouTube using the youtube-data-api package,6 as it captures both standard links to YouTube.com
as well as shortened YouTube links (e.g., youtu.be) and embedded YouTube links. The resulting
dataset contains 3,658,455 and 4,363,124 links to YouTube on Twitter and Reddit respectively. The
youtube-data-api package also extracts YouTube video IDs from these links, yielding 3,273,473
and 3,641,872 unique YouTube videos on Twitter and Reddit. Of these videos, 284,875 appear in
both platforms, resulting in a total of 6,630,470 YouTube videos.
3.1 Identifying Potentially Harmful YouTube Videos
We are particularly interested in whether YouTube’s change affects the prevalence of anti-social
content in other platforms. To this end, we must identify “potentially harmful or misinforming”
YouTube videos, but no video metadata appears to be available in YouTube’s APIs that would suggest
whether a video is being or has been removed from recommendation. While Google, YouTube’s
affiliate company, makes its guidelines for human annotation public in its “Search Quality Evaluator
Guidelines”7, and these guidelines include sections on “Potentially Harmful Pages” and “Pages that
Potentially Misinform Users”, it is unclear whether and how these guidelines also apply to YouTube
videos. As a result, we lack a YouTube-native method to identify videos that have been flagged for
removal from recommendation, meaning it is difficult to test directly whether these same videos
are shared less on other platforms.
This exploration therefore studies three sets of videos that evidence suggests have been affected
by YouTube’s modifications:
Conspiracy-Oriented Videos. Our first set consists of the 6,752 videos curated by Faddoul et al.
[9], as these videos have experienced a decline in recommendation within YouTube’s platform. As
this decline is potentially attributable to YouTube’s internal changes, evaluating how these videos
are shared on other platforms will provide important insights about cross-platform effects. Further
motivating our focus on these videos are articles in the popular press that report YouTube’s efforts as
targeting “conspiracy” videos,8. Though YouTube has not explicitly referred to the targeted content
using that label, popular discussion characterizes it as such. Furthermore, the recent COVID-19
pandemic and resulting conspiracies has had potentially significant public-health consequences
[4, 7], so evaluating cross-platform impact of such health-related information will inform decisions
on how to combat health misinformation. We refer to this set as the Conspiracy Video set.
Videos from Conspiracy-Oriented Channels. Following from the Faddoul et al. video dataset, we
expand our work to include 85,818 videos produced by channels who have produced a conspiracy-
labeled video. These channels, which include sources like “Age of Truth TV”, “Destroying the
Illusion”, and “Zohar StarGate Ancient Discoveries”, are unified around topics like alternative histo-
ries, battling “corporate propaganda”, and political conspiracies. We make a distinction between the
above conspiracy-video set from Faddoul et al. and this channel-based set as these source channels
5https://github.com/smAPPNYU/urlexpander
6https://github.com/smAPPNYU/youtube-data-api
7https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/guidelines.raterhub.com/en/
/searchqualityevaluatorguidelines.pdf
8https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/technology/youtube-conspiracy-theory-videos.html
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provide strong topical indicators of conspiracy, already have a conspiracy-oriented audience, and
to provide a similar channel-based selection process to our following datasets. Aggregating these
quality metrics to the source outlet level has also been used for evaluating news outlet quality
in studies of low-quality news (e.g., Grinberg et al. [11]). We refer to this set as the Conspiracy
Channel set.
AIN Videos. Our third test set is composed of 40,764 politically extreme videos curated from a
collection of “alternative” YouTube channels, dubbed the AIN [16]. These AIN channels provide
“an alternative media source for viewers to obtain news and political commentary” that “facilitates
radicalization” [16] and therefore appear to satisfy YouTube’s definition of misinforming/harmful
content (though we acknowledge no publicly available mechanism exists to identify definitively
what videos YouTube has labeled).9 As videos posted to these channels experienced a steep decline in
recommendation in February 2019 [26], these videos appear to overlap with YouTube’s classification
scheme and provide an alternative, non-conspiratorial set of information sources when compared
to the above two test sets. Using these AIN channels as a source, we have identified 40,764 unique
videos from 69 channels using YouTube’s API. We refer to this set as the AIN set.
3.2 Building a Control Set of YouTube Videos
While the above collections are intended to capture videos that have been removed from recom-
mendation by YouTube, we also construct a dataset of videos that likely are not subject to this
removal as a control dataset to evaluate whether any effect we capture is specific to the video
types of interest. Such a control set should be similar in nature to the targeted content but have a
low likelihood of receiving this de-recommendation treatment. Mainstream news is a good such
set in that it is similar in topic to the political content touched on in both conspiracy and AIN
videos. Likewise, as suggested within Google’s own Search Quality Evaluator Guidelines, reviewers
should “find high-quality, trustworthy sources to check accuracy and the consensus of experts”,
mainstream sources are considered generally high-quality and trustworthy. As such, videos posted
by mainstream news YouTube channels should be unlikely to be classified as potentially harmful
or misinforming.
To this end, we have identified 65 mainstream news sources from across the political spectrum
(e.g., CNN, NPR, Fox News, Bloomberg, etc.) and their related YouTube channels. Again, using
YouTube’s API we have collected all videos published by these channels as of 24 March 2020,
resulting in 790,377 videos. We refer to this set as the MainStream Media (MSM) set.
To ensure our control dataset is sufficiently separate from our test datasets, Table 1 shows the
overlap among all four video types. As the table illustrates, the mainstream news video set has
very small overlap with the conspiracy set and no overlap with the other two sets. Manual analysis
of these 28 conspiracy videos that appear in the MSM set suggest some of these videos are false
positives from the Faddoul et al. conspiracy classifier as the majority of videos discuss unidentified
flying objects (UFOs) (e.g., “Inside the Navy’s 2015 encounter with a UFO”, “Neil deGrasse Tyson:
UFO doesn’t mean aliens”, and “New spy plane? You be the judge”).
Surprisingly, however, we see relatively little overlap between the Faddoul et al. conspiracy video
set and our conspiracy channel set; one would expect the conspiracy videos to be a subset of the
channel set given that we collect all videos from channels that appear in Faddoul et al. When we
visit a subset of these missing videos, however, we see many of them have been deleted or made
private.
9A selection of these channels have already been deleted by YouTube.
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Table 1. Overlap in YouTube Video Sets. Each cell represents the number of videos in common between the
video set in the column and row.
Conspiracy
Videos
Conspiracy
Channel Videos
AIN Videos MSM Videos
Conspiracy
Videos
6,752 2,615 32 28
Conspiracy
Channel Videos
2,615 85,830 0 0
AIN Videos 32 0 40,764 0
MSM Videos 28 0 0 790,163
4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We first calculate the daily tweets on Twitter and submissions on Reddit, which we collectively
refer to as “posts” and extract the daily number of posts containing 1) links to YouTube videos, 2)
links to conspiracy-labeled videos, 3) links to videos from conspiracy-oriented channels, 4) links to
AIN-produced videos, and 4) links to videos from mainstream news sources. Time series for each
of these video types divide into two regimes: pre- and post-YouTube’s announcement, or 1 October
2018 to 24 January 2019 (inclusive) and 25 January 2019 to 31 May 2019. We maintain time series
data for each platform and sharing type and collect data on post frequencies to both platforms: np,t
captures the number of messages n posted to platform p ∈ {T ,R} for Twitter or Reddit respectively
on day t . We also capture vp,t , cp,t , ccp,t , ap,t , andmp,t as the number of links to YouTube videos
v , conspiracy videos c , conspiracy-channel videos cc , AIN-authored videos a, and MSM videosm
on platform p during day t .
We normalize these time series to remove dependencies on the frequencies of posting as follows:
For general YouTube shares, we calculate the proportion of posts that contain links to YouTube
ρyt,t = vp,t/np,t , and for AIN/conspiracy/mainstream news videos, we calculate the proportion
of daily YouTube links that contain either of these types: ρX ,t = Xp,t/vp,t∀X ∈ {c, cc,a,m}. Table
2 shows the means of these values and their changes before and after YouTube’s announcement,
demonstrating that these changes are generally quite small, often fractions of a percent. While the
factors influencing these changes are varied, from YouTube’s internal changes to content creator
response to seasonality, we see consistent decreases in general YouTube sharing, conspiracy-labeled
video sharing, and AIN sharing. At the same time, we see increases in content from conspiracy
channels and mainstream news sharing in both platforms.
4.1 Time Series Data
Figure 1 presents the changes in general sharing of tweets, Reddit submissions, and links to YouTube
videos over these 8 months. From this figure, one can see the number of tweets on Twitter varies
from three to four million per day with a slight upward trend. For Reddit, submissions per day varies
between 200 thousand and 500 thousand with a strong weekly periodicity and also exhibits an
upward trend. Examining the proportions of posts containing links to YouTube presents a different
trend, however, with both Twitter and Reddit seeing a decrease in posts with links to YouTube
over this 8-month timeframe. Despite this similar trend, one should note YouTube videos are much
more popular on Reddit than they are Twitter, accounting for approximately an order of magnitude
more submissions than tweets.
A distinct point from Figure 1 is the marked drop in proportion of tweets containing links to
YouTube ρyt on 1 February 2019. This significant drop can be attributed to a change to YouTube’s
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Table 2. Changes in YouTube sharing before and after YouTube’s announcement, operationalized as the
proportion of posts containing links to YouTube and the proportion of YouTube shares linking to conspiracy,
AIN, and mainstream news videos. Mean changes in these proportions show decreases in sharing of general
YouTube videos, conspiracy-labeled videos, and AIN-videos, whereas sharing of conspiracy channel-sourced
videos and mainstream news videos are increasing.
Twitter Reddit
Sharing Type Pre- Post- ∆ Pre- Post- ∆
General YouTube Sharing ρyt 0.8806% 0.5792% –34.23% 8.969% 7.959% –11.25%
Conspiracy Video Sharing ρc 0.1824% 0.1438% –21.16% 0.1481% 0.0872% –41.12%
Conspiracy Chan. Sharing ρcc 0.2058% 0.2658% 29.16% 0.1907% 0.2008% 5.296%
AIN Chan. Sharing ρa 0.1336% 0.1265% –5.314% 0.3407% 0.2761% -18.96%
MSM Chan. Sharing ρm 0.2104% 0.3065% 45.67% 0.4414% 0.5259% 19.14%
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This drop in proportions of tweets linking to 
YouTube videos is attributable to YouTube’s 
disabling the “Automatic sharing of YouTube 
activity to Twitter” capability in its creator suite.
Fig. 1. Time series data on daily posting of tweets and submissions and proportions of posts that contain
YouTube links. The red line marks January 25, the date of YouTube’s announcement. One should note the
significant decline in the proportion of tweets containing links to YouTube videos that occurs on 1 February,
which is attributable to a change in YouTube’s content creator suite that removed the “Automatic sharing of
YouTube activity to Twitter” capability.
content publishing platform that went into effect on this day. According to a support notice posted
by YouTube’s engineering team,10 YouTube has removed the “Automatic sharing of YouTube activity
to Twitter” feature from content creators’ “Connected apps” options, removing a pathway through
which content creators could automatically share to Twitter when they uploaded a new video.
Relatedly, Figure 2 shows the variations in proportions of sharing for the four video types we
examine. Qualitatively, this figure demonstrates that sharing of both Faddoul et al. conspiracy
videos and AIN videos have decreasing tails towards the end of our timeframe. Conspiracy-video
sharing shows a clear decrease in April, consistent with a decrease in in-platform recommendations
found in Faddoul et al. [9]. AIN videos exhibit a similar decrease but not until the middle of May.
10https://support.google.com/youtube/thread/989408?hl=en
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Fig. 2. Time series data on daily proportions of videos shared that contain links to conspiracy-labeled,
conspiracy-channel, AIN, and mainstream videos. The red line marks January 25, the date of YouTube’s
announcement. AIN sharing appears to taper off to a small amount in late May.
Conspiracy channel-sourced videos, however, do not exhibit a similar qualitative decline in either
platform. Mainstream news videos appear more prevalent on Reddit than Twitter and seem to be
increasing in the proportion of sharing.
These findings have two implications: First, the decline in conspiracy and AIN videos in the
spring of 2020 suggests YouTube’s actions can impact in sharing across platform boundaries. Second,
the steep decline of YouTube sharing in Twitter on 1 February suggests confounds our ability to
identify the impact of YouTube’s recommendation system changes and therefore necessitates a
more sophisticated approach, which we introduce below.
5 MODELING YOUTUBE’S IMPACT IN PRE- AND POST-TREATMENT SHARING
Given the difficulty in separating factors that contribute to changes in the aggregate sharing
patterns shown in Table 2, we introduce an alternate controlled ITS log-log linear regression model
to predict volumes of general YouTube videos, AIN-authored videos, and conspiracy videos. In
principal, this ITS model is similar to that employed by Chandrasekharan et al. [6], and more detail
can be found in the ITS tutorial by Bernal et al. [2]. ITS models are particularly applicable in this
context as they allow us to capture both level and trend changes brought about by an intervention
(here, YouTube’s change). Because platform effects and time lags likely impact the cross-platform
sharing (e.g., a de-recommended YouTube video may be on the front page of Reddit the day before
YouTube institutes its change, leading Reddit users to see this video for some period of time after
YouTube’s change), we expect the effects of YouTube’s intervention to intensify over time, and the
ITS model allows us to capture this effect with its trend parameter. Furthermore, by adding a model
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fitted to control data, we can contextualize these results and increase our confidence that any effect
observed only in the treatment set is a result of the intervention [3].
We first model the sharing of conspiracy-labeled videos in Equation 1, where vp,t captures
the number of videos posted on day t to platform p, cp,t−1 captures the lagged auto-regressive
properties of sharing (i.e., the influence of the prior day in sharing), Tt is an indicator function
for whether the day t is after 24 January 2019, dt denotes the number of days after 25 January
2019 (and is equal to zero prior to that date), and βi variables are the coefficients we learn for
each factor. We likewise model conspiracy-channel-sourced, AIN, and mainstream news videos
in Equations 2, 3, and 4 respectively. One should note that in these models, sharing volumes are
log-transformed to account for the highly skewed nature of sharing in social networks, leading us
to expect proportional changes in response rather than directly linear changes. Furthermore, we
focus only on the percentage on videos shared on each platform rather than the percentage of posts
because overall post volumes are subject to numerous additional factors. Of particular concern is
YouTube’s change to its content creator suite, as shown in Figure 1, that has artificially reduced the
overall number of YouTube videos. Instead, our focus is on the distribution of videos since YouTube
is not decreasing the number of videos it recommends.
ln(cp,t + 1) = β1 ln(vp,t + 1) + β2 ln(cp,t−1 + 1) + β3Tt + β4dt (1)
ln(ccp,t + 1) = β1 ln(vp,t + 1) + β2 ln(ccp,t−1 + 1) + β3Tt + β4dt (2)
ln(ap,t + 1) = β1 ln(vp,t + 1) + β2 ln(ap,t−1 + 1) + β3Tt + β4dt (3)
ln(mp,t + 1) = β1 ln(vp,t + 1) + β2 ln(mp,t−1 + 1) + β3Tt + β4dt (4)
5.1 Pre- and Post-Treatment Sharing – Conspiracy-Labeled Videos
As mentioned in Equation 1, our ITS model has four primary factors explaining the daily sharing
of Faddoul et al.’s conspiracy-labeled videos cp,t on p ∈ {Reddit, Twitter} on day t : volume of posts
containing videos vp,t on that platform and day, the lagged number of AIN videos shared on that
platform on the prior day vp,t−1, whether the day is before or after the announcement date Tt ,
and the number of days since the announcement was made dt . Assuming that YouTube’s internal
changes have a compounding impact over the broader ecosystem, we expect that β4 < 0 in both
Twitter and Reddit.
Table 3 supports this expectation for conspiracy video sharing, showing the distance from
YouTube’s announcement β4 does manifest with a significant and negative effect on trends for both
Twitter and Reddit. This model suggests that, for each day that passes since the announcement, we
can expect on average 0.7% fewer conspiracy-labeled videos shared on both platforms. The level
factor β3 (being before or after the treatment date) is not significant in either platform, consistent
with a phased roll-out of YouTube’s change. As expected, the number of posts linking to YouTube
on a given day vp,t and lagged sharing are both significant, positive factors in predicting daily
sharing of these videos.
5.2 Pre- and Post-Treatment Sharing – Conspiracy-Channel Videos
The model of YouTube’s announcement on the sharing of videos from conspiracy-oriented channels
follows a different pattern that what we find in conspiracy-labeled videos. Table 4 suggests that,
unlike above, YouTube’s announcement has had no significant impact on trends in sharing of
conspiracy videos on either platform. Conversely, the overall level of conspiracy sharing increases
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Table 3. Capturing impact of YouTube’s announcement on Faddoul et al. conspiracy video sharing in Twitter
and Reddit with a log-log linear regression ITS model. Models show consistent declines in trend across Twitter
and Reddit.
Twitter Reddit
Predictor β Std. Err. β Std. Err.
YouTube Volume vp,t 0.2303∗∗∗ 0.022 0.1843∗∗∗ 0.0200
Lagged conspiracy sharing cp,t−t 0.3997∗∗∗ 0.058 0.4815∗∗∗ 0.0560
Treatment Tt 0.1246 0.078 0.0586 0.085
Distance from Treatment dt −0.0079∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.0059∗∗∗ 0.001
Observations 242 242
R2 0.971 0.985
Note: ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001
significantly on Reddit during the post-treatment regime. The model suggests that, since the an-
nouncement, sharing of videos from conspiracy-oriented channels has increased by approximately
16% on Reddit.
Table 4. Capturing impact of YouTube’s announcement on sharing of videos from conspiracy-oriented
channels in Twitter and Reddit with a log-log linear regression ITS model. Models show an inconsistency
between Twitter and Reddit wherein conspiracy sharing on Reddit sees an increase following the treatment
of YouTube’s announcement, but this effect is not significant in Twitter.
Twitter Reddit
Predictor β Std. Err. β Std. Err.
YouTube Volume vp,t 0.2977∗∗∗ 0.025 0.3169∗∗∗ 0.024
Lagged cons. chan. sharing ccp,t−t 0.2506∗∗∗ 0.062 0.1696∗∗ 0.062
Treatment Tt 0.0472 0.040 0.1627∗∗ 0.049
Distance from Treatment dt −0.0003 0.000 −0.0008 0.001
Observations 242 242
R2 0.998 0.997
Note: ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.3 Pre- and Post-Treatment Sharing – AIN Videos
Table 5 presents results for AIN video sharing in Twitter and Reddit. As with conspiracy videos
and our expectation that YouTube’s changes will decrease sharing beyond its boundaries, distance
from YouTube’s announcement β4 does manifest with a significant and negative effect on trends
in AIN sharing for both Twitter and Reddit. This model suggests that, for each day that passes
since the announcement, we can expect approximately 0.3% fewer AIN videos shared on both
platforms. The level factor β3 is not significant in either platform, consistent with a phased roll-out
of YouTube’s change. As expected, the number of posts linking to YouTube on a given day vp,t and
lagged sharing are both significant, positive factors in predicting daily sharing of AIN videos.
5.4 Pre- and Post-Treatment Sharing – Mainstream News Videos
Recalling that the above models are meant to instrument the effect YouTube’s announcement about
its recommendation system has had on the sharing of specific types of anti-social content, this
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Table 5. Capturing impact of YouTube’s announcement on the sharing of AIN-produced videos in Twitter and
Reddit with a log-log linear regression ITS model. Model results show a consistent reduction in AIN sharing
significantly correlated to the distance from YouTube’s announcement (i.e., the treatment) in both Twitter
and Reddit.
Twitter Reddit
Predictor β Std. Err. β Std. Err.
YouTube Volume vp,t 0.1330∗∗∗ 0.018 0.1073∗∗∗ 0.019
Lagged AIN sharing ap,t−t 0.6209∗∗∗ 0.051 0.7554∗∗∗ 0.042
Treatment Tt 0.0784 0.076 0.1237 0.063
Distance from Treatment dt −0.0036∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.0033∗∗∗ 0.001
Observations 242 242
R2 0.988 0.995
Note: ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001
section turns to a type of video that should not be impacted by this announcement or engineering
change. Table 6 shows no significant decrease in either the level or trend in sharing of mainstream
news videos on either Twitter or Reddit between the pre- and post-treatment regimes. Rather, we
see significant increases in sharing trends in both platforms, and a significant increase in the level
of mainstream news sharing in Reddit following YouTube’s announcement.
Table 6. Capturing impact of YouTube’s announcement on mainstream news video sharing in Twitter and
Reddit with a log-log linear regression ITS model. The models show sharing of mainstream news videos in
both platforms actually has increased in both platforms.
Twitter Reddit
Predictor β Std. Err. β Std. Err.
YouTube Volume vp,t 0.2611∗∗∗ 0.024 0.3214∗∗∗ 0.027
Lagged MSM sharing mp,t−t 0.3438∗∗∗ 0.061 0.3068∗∗∗ 0.059
Treatment Tt −0.0506 0.053 0.0971∗ 0.043
Distance from Treatment dt 0.0023∗∗ 0.001 0.0012∗ 0.001
Observations 242 242
R2 0.996 0.998
Note: ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.5 Results Summary
Table 7 summarizes results from the above models, showing that both conspiracy-labeled and
AIN-authored videos experience significant downward trends in sharing on both platforms. Further-
more, as the mainstream media control set experiences significant increases in trend across both
platforms and a significant level change in Reddit, the control suggests trend changes experienced
by conspiracy-labeled and AIN videos is differentiated from overall changes in news sharing on
YouTube or its popularity.
6 DISCUSSION
Apparent from these studies are two findings that persist across platforms: YouTube’s announcement
and resulting change to their recommendation algorithm seems to have had a significant suppressive
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Table 7. Summary of Trend and Level Changes Across Video Types and Platforms.  represents no significant
effect, and we use +/− to denote significant increases or decreases in this factor.
Twitter Reddit
Video Type Trend Level Trend Level
Conspiracy-Labeled Videos −∗∗∗  −∗∗∗ 
Conspiracy-Channel Videos    +∗∗
AIN-Channel Videos −∗∗∗  −∗∗∗ 
MSM-Channel Videos +∗∗  +∗ +∗
Note: ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001
effect on the sharing of videos that have been labeled as conspiracy content (see Table 3), and this
suppressive effect appears to apply to AIN videos as well (Table 5). With an increase in mainstream
news sharing during this same timeframe, we have additional evidence for our claim that reductions
experienced by conspiracy and AIN videos are related to YouTube’s actions. Here, we discuss a
selection of implications from these results.
6.1 De-Recommendation Versus Deletion and Anti-Censorship
A key point in “de-recommendation” as a tool for platform moderation and governance is how it is
differentiated from the deletion of content. While removing content from YouTube’s platform may
be the most heavy-handed way to reduce exposure to this harmful and misinforming content, it is
clearly not the only solution, so the question becomes one of which action best achieves the desired
effect of increasing information quality. On the one hand, as shown in Chandrasekharan et al.,
wholesale banning and deletion of anti-social users and communities is effective within a specific
platform [6], and if YouTube were to delete such content, as they have announced with supremacist
videos, stumbling across links to this content from other platforms (e.g., Twitter or Reddit) are of
little value or risk. On the other hand, actively deleting content, especially if that content is popular,
has the potential to backfire and counter-productively increase the target content’s popularity, a
phenomenon dubbed the “Streisand effect” [13].
Platform-level deletion of popular but subversive content may be particularly likely to trigger
the Streisand effect given current anti-censorship concerns professed by political and media elites
in the US. AIN channels in particular may push such anti-censorship narratives when platforms
delete their content, as a consistent theme among these channels is their anti-establishment and
anti-mainstream position. Thus, when a platform like YouTube actively deletes content, these
channels may respond with claims of censorship and galvanize their followings.
A prime and recent example of backfires in response to platform deletion is with the popularity
of the “Plandemic” movie, a debunked and scientifically inaccurate anti-vaccine video that has been
extremely popular during the recent COVID-19 pandemic [21]. As Lytvynenko discusses in the
popular press article about the rise of this video,11, the main personality in “Plandemic” is framed
as a “whistleblower”, and the resulting deletion of this video on Facebook and YouTube trigger
provide an anti-censorship narrative that bolsters this frame.
Consequently, de-recommendation could be an alternate response that social media platforms
could take without actively deleting this video and thereby avoid triggering this anti-censorship
framing. Prior research on the dissemination of “fake news” [12] suggests low-quality content tends
to stay within insular communities, so removing pathways that incidentally expose the uninitiated
11https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/janelytvynenko/coronavirus-plandemic-viral-
harmful-fauci-mikovits
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(e.g., via automated recommendations) may therefore still achieve the pro-social outcomes we see
above.
6.2 De-Recommendation Versus Deletion and Transparency
While deletion may be the most effective strategy to mitigate YouTube’s role in spreading misin-
forming and harmful content online, making YouTube responsible for policing what is considered
“harmful” discourse introduces its own difficulties. Since YouTube does not provide a mechanism
through which the public can identify this harmful content, an individual is given little feedback if
she inadvertently stumbles upon such a video (e.g., from a link on Facebook, WhatsApp, or Twitter).
Likewise, a content creator whose videos are flagged by this system has no way of knowing and
therefore no recourse in challenging YouTube’s classification. Given YouTube’s position as the
dominant video sharing platform and its lack of transparency and the absence of regulatory incen-
tives to support the public good, making YouTube a major arbiter of what is considered allowable
concentrates significant political and informational power into a single entity.
6.3 Growing Content from Conspiracy-Oriented Channels
An additional difficultly particularly germane to this discussion is the ambiguity in defining “misin-
forming and harmful” content. In our study, YouTube’s action does not appear to have significant
impact on content from conspiracy-oriented channels; in fact, we see, as with the control set,
an increase in conspiracy-channel sharing. While it could be that the propagation of conspiracy-
channel videos is entirely separate from YouTube’s recommendations, we instead propose two
other explanations:
One plausible explanation may lie in the content creation strategies employed by these channels.
YouTube’s announcement, regardless of underlying platform changes, may incentivize outlets
to shift their content creation strategies to be more inline with YouTube’s policies. To that end,
channels may strategically remove content that could be considered harmful or misinforming under
the quality guidelines Google has made available. In fact, we see some evidence for this activity in
Table 1, where many conspiracy-labeled videos were not acquired in our channel-directed collection,
as they had been deleted or made private.
Another more troubling explanation for the growth in content from conspiracy-oriented chan-
nels stems from what replaces the content YouTube is no longer recommending. Holding other
quantities equal, removing harmful videos from recommendation opens slots for new videos to
be recommended. It is therefore possible that the audience to which these harmful videos would
be recommended are instead recommended the more innocuous or borderline videos from these
channels, as these conspiracy videos may be semantically or socially adjacent to the harmful or
misinforming content. That is, this audience may have then inadvertently been diverted from
“harmful” content to other content from these conspiracy channels. Without additional insight from
YouTube about how this mechanism works and whether harmful videos are replaced with the next
most similar video or with a more pro-social video, we are limited in understanding this interplay.
It is nonetheless important to consider these unintended consequences and whether YouTube’s
actions create new incentives for more subtle misinformation and harmful content.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY AND OTHER LIMITATIONS
We acknowledge the difficulty in making causal claims in this context, as the information ecosystem
is complex, and we are able to capture only portions of it. Below, we identify potential threats to
our claims and related limitations.
First, our choice of January 25 to divide treatment regimes is potentially problematic, as YouTube
may not have deployed these changes at the same time of their announcement. Results in Faddoul
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et al., for instance, show recommendations to conspiracy videos did not reach a minimum until
late April 2019, with marked declines not obvious from their data until March [9]. Despite this
concern, no other date presents a clearer distinction, as YouTube’s blog post says their deployment
will be a “gradual change” and will be rolled out over time as their models “become more accurate”
[29]. In fact, results shown in Suzor [26] show a marked decrease in AIN recommendations on 14
February, consistent with a gradual deployment and further suggesting that YouTube did not deploy
this change on a single date. Our ITS models are able to account for these gradual deployments
through the trend factor, however, and such methods are generally used in these instances where
the treatment effect is expected to compound over time. As such, while we acknowledge this
potential issue in date selection, better results are unlikely without more input from YouTube about
the exact date they deployed this change.
In this same vein, as declines in conspiracy and AIN sharing do not occur simultaneously
(conspiracy declines in April, while AIN content declines in May), an alternative explanation may
stem from an additional YouTube announcement in early June that supremacist content or “videos
that promote or glorify Nazi ideology” are to be removed from the platform [30]. Though this
more recent announcement states these new content policies went into effect on June 5, they
mention “it will take time for [YouTube’s] systems to fully ramp up and [YouTube will] be gradually
expanding coverage over the next several months” [30]. It is therefore possible that the decline in
AIN-related content stems from removal as a precursor to the June 5 announcement. To address
this potentiality, we have checked our initial set of 40,764 AIN-produced videos to see how many
remain on YouTube’s platform, and we find 37,612 of these 40,764 remained in July 2019; that is,
only 7.732% of videos in our AIN set have been removed.
Our selection of mainstream media channels as a control set may also threaten our results.
Guidance from in Bernal et al. is to select highly similar control sets while avoiding sets that may
be subject to indirect effects from the intervention [3], and we initially anticipated mainstream
videos would not be subject secondary effects from de-recommending misinforming videos. In
retrospect, the increase we see in YouTube’s mainstream news sharing on both Twitter and Reddit
may result from indirect effects wherein YouTube replaces recommendations to misinforming
content with recommendations to more mainstream content. While our findings remain consistent
in the decreasing trends in conspiracy-labeled and AIN videos even given this potential indirect
effect on the control set, this decrease may stem from an overall decline in YouTube popularity that
the indirect effects on the control mask. Our finding of null effects on trends in conspiracy-channel
videos provide some evidence that this alternate interpretation is incorrect. An alternative control
set could be devised, but it would likely need to deviate further from the type of videos under
treatment.
Beyond these threats are several key limitations, first of which is that our analysis omits informa-
tion consumption patterns (i.e., who is seeing these videos). While the best solution to this threat
would be to use impression and view data, this information is highly protected by the platforms
and is therefore difficult to collect. As such, we use link sharing as a proxy for consumption. We
note though that we make an important distinction between the proportion of shared links and
the proportion of shared videos. Recommendation changes should affect this composition of shared
videos under the expectation that changes to the composition of recommendations, as YouTube
claims, will be reflected in changes to composition of what is shared, regardless of audience size.
Additionally, our reliance on Faddoul et al. for a collection of conspiracy-focused videos introduces
dependency into our analysis, as is unclear whether the automated system introduced therein
matches the decisions of Google’s quality raters or YouTube’s automated detection tools. While
Faddoul et al. do provide strong evidence for a set of videos that have been subjected to YouTube’s
de-recommendation, one cannot retrospectively reproduce this dataset as their methodology relies
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on streaming collections of YouTube recommendations. Perhaps the most correct path forward
would be to partner with YouTube and obtain a listing of videos YouTube has identified as conspiracy,
but this approach would require platform-level buy-in.
Lastly, Facebook’s exclusion from this analysis is also an important limitation. Facebook’s massive
user base and population of topic-specific pages and groups could be a gathering place for people
interested in the potentially anti-social topics YouTube wishes to target. Given many internet users
engage across several platforms [24], variations in video sharing could result from an action taken
by Facebook similar to that of Reddit described in Chandrasekharan et al. [6]. This issue is difficult
to address given current data limitations from Facebook, but we are actively working on future
research to address this threat.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Ultimately, this work suggests YouTube’s efforts appear to have had a pro-social effect on cross-
platform sharing. While it is unlikely this approach will affect niche, anonymous communities and
individuals who are already predisposed to conspiratorial thinking or “corrupted epistemology", as
coined by Sunstein [25], reducing wide exposure to such content is likely a social good. As concerns
about YouTube and its role in misinforming and radicalizing individuals increases, it is good to
see the platform take steps to address these issues that appear to have an effect rather than being
simply lip service.
From a more general perspective, the evidence outlined herein suggests removing potentially
harmful content from recommendation strikes an effective pro-social balance between allowing
anti-social or subversive views to remain available without actively promoting and propagating
this content. That is, individuals have the right to share their views but do not have the right to
the platform’s assistance in monetizing those views. Other platforms seemingly employ similar
strategies to reduce the spread of such content, as explored by Reddit with quarantining subreddits
andWhatsApp in preventing individuals from sharing links more than five times. Facebook likewise
suppresses (though does not remove) content fact-checkers have identified as untrue, and Twitter
could employ a similar strategy by removing anti-social content from trending and discovery
sections. More draconian approaches could disable native retweeting of specific content or disable
native sharing for anti-social content; critically, individuals could still share this content manually,
but adding an extra step to the propagation of such content could have a wide impact.
That said, we should be concerned about the wholesale application of this approach without
further research into potential unintended consequences and what kinds of content get propa-
gated instead. The growth we see in content from conspiracy-oriented channels may be one such
unintended consequence, with borderline content that was not classified as harmful receiving
more recommendations in place of the harmful content that was removed. Without additional
transparency, we have little insight into what this borderline content is that survives YouTubeâĂŹs
classification pipeline but is still potentially misinforming; i.e., where is the line between harmful
and unharmful content and does content close to this line end up spreading even more? Applying
such automated classification pipelines without careful and transparent consideration repeats the
kinds of choices that brought online platforms to this point in the first place. Additional information
and error analysis on the performance of YouTubeâĂŹs automated classification pipeline and
details on the qualitative human assessments are necessary for this insight.
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